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Fu Hualing
1 This book is a timely study of the historical development of, and contemporary debate
on, administrative punishment in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Administrative
punishment is an intermediary punishment imposed on people who have committed
minor offences, as legally defined, and do not deserve criminal punishment. To put
intermediary  punishment  into  perspective,  one  can  imagine  China’s  penal  regime
operating like a gigantic sliding slope as envisaged by Victor Li1: The vast majority of
offences in China are minor and are handled within the community. This first tier of
social control intervenes at the earliest signs of deviance, which are handled “softly”
through neighbourhood mediation,  provision of  education and assistance,  or  police
warnings  and  fines.  Intervention  at  this  level  is  informal,  relatively  cheap, less
stigmatising because of its restorative orientation, and more particularistic so as to
better suit the needs of each individual case. A second tier, representing a more formal
and “harder” form of intervention, kicks in when community efforts fail  to deliver.
This is the sphere in which police impose a series of intermediary punishments on a
wide range of minor offences for which criminal punishment is deemed unwarranted.
The tier of the criminal justice system is reserved for those who have not been saved by
earlier  interventions  and  have  slid  to  the  bottom  of  the  slope  the  “incorrigible”
individuals who have committed serious offences.
2 The  book  focuses  on  three  major  intermediary  punishments  in  China,  including
Detention for  Education (for  prostitutes  and their  clients,  commonly referred to  as
Women’s Education Stations, since the vast majority of inmates are female prostitutes);
coercive drug rehabilitation (for drug addicts) and Re-education Through Labour (RTL)
(for offenders of minor crimes).
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3 Intermediary punishment shares the following characteristics that makes it worthy of
separate and concentrated academic treatment:
4 (1) the punishment is harsh and disproportionate;
5 (2) decision are made by police alone, with little, if any, external supervision;
6 (3) there is virtually no judicial oversight; and
7 (4) there are very few rules and procedures, public or internal, governing the process.
8 Indeed,  RTL  in  particular  has  attracted  the  most  critical  attention  over  the  past
decades,  during  the  course  of  which  scholars,  activists,  and  policy-makers  have
deliberated on the legality and effectiveness of such intermediary punishment and its
proper status in an increasingly rule-based legal system.
9 The author of this book successfully places intermediary punishment in its historical
context  by  tracing  its  theoretical/  ideological  foundation  to  the  Maoist  theory  of
contradictions,  which  was  (and  to  some  degree  is  still)  the  principal  guideline  for
handling social conflict. The PRC was and remains a “democratic dictatorship,” which
is often interpreted as democracy for the people and dictatorship for the enemy
(however defined). Like other revolutionary regimes, the PRC state is characterised by a
dual system of justice, one for people who are supportive of the regime and the other
for people considered hostile to it. The theory of contradictions justified the creation of
a  series  of  non-criminal  measures  to  control  minor  violation  of  law  when  the
perpetrators were not class enemies. The reality for the Communists was that “people”
who were supportive of  the government also committed crimes.  Then the question
became: are all crimes to be treated as antagonistic contradictions, and are all criminals
subject to the dictatorship regardless of their political status?
10 The Chinese Communist  Party (CCP)  tried to  justify  the existence of  criminality  by
arguing  that  “people”  who  committed  crimes  were  “the  feeble  minded  who  were
influenced by hostile foreign and domestic ideologies” and that “crime is left over from
the old social system.”2 But there was a fundamental inconsistency in the government’s
handling of offences of an apolitical nature. On the one hand, Mao insisted that “people
cannot exercise dictatorship over themselves;  nor can a part  of  the people oppress
another part,” thus limiting the use of the method of dictatorship (i.e. criminal law)
against “people” who were led astray and committed crime. On the other hand, Mao
also said that “lawbreaking elements among the people should be subjected to punitive
legal restraints,” but with the qualification that exercising dictatorship over “people”
who committed crime was in principle different from exercising dictatorship over the
enemies of the people.3
11 Intermediary  punishment  was  designed  and  developed  to  capture  offenders  in  the
twilight zone between the “people” and their “enemies,” and between crime and non-
crime. It also reflected the contradiction within the theory of contradictions.
12 Biddulph’s book is also successful in highlighting the importance of structural changes
in the penal regime. Literature on administrative punishment in China tends to focus
on the normative and ideological changes that motivate reform. Normative shifts aside,
the author also identifies structural changes in the penal regime that challenge the
viability and legitimacy of intermediary punishment. The author rightly points out that
great reliance has been placed on intermediary punishment since the early 1980s, as a
result of which the system is now over-stretched and fatally strained.
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13 Victor Li was writing about community solidarity and collectivism in the Maoist era,
and the “help” he referred to mainly took the form of peer pressure in the community,
political persuasion by “significant others,” and even warnings by local police. Key to
the vision of a gradual sliding into the criminal justice system, which maintained the
possibility of early intervention to prevent such sliding, was the existence of a stable
social structure in the form of a well-organised community, effective local governance,
and a strong rehabilitative and preventative ideology.
14 This  communitarian  paradigm  has  faded  away  and  become  illusive  in  the  reform
period. The kind of community that Victor Li wrote about has largely vanished in the
past  decades  because of  urban development,  characterised by a  sudden increase  in
migrants and a systematic dismantling of the old neighbourhood structure. There is
also  a  clear  shift  in  the  rehabilitative  and  preventative  ideology  that  underpinned
community  justice.  Intervention  at  the  earliest  opportunity  becomes  much  less
appealing  and  legitimate  in  an  age  when  emphasis  is  placed  firmly  on  individual
freedom and rights in the social and economic spheres.  This change has been well-
documented, and its impact on local social order is overwhelming.
15 As a result of this social change, the utility of the traditional first tier of social control
has been reduced to little more than a formality. Market reform has narrowed out and
thinned the community to such an extent that it no longer has the capacity to absorb
disputes and minor violations of law. Without the community serving as a buffer zone
for screening out minor problems, police and other formal institutions are pushed to
the frontline.
16 The author effectively documents the re-emergence of problems associated with drug
use and prostitution and the surge in crime and disorder in general, accompanied by
the increasing reliance on the three types of intermediary punishment the book covers.
However, the most drastic increase has been in another intermediary punishment that
the  book  does  not  cover:  cases  handled  according  to  the  Security  Administrative
Punishment Regulations (SAPR),  or  the current Security Administrative Punishment
Law (SAPL). In 1986, the police accepted slightly more than one million SAPR cases, but
the  number  increased  to  more  than  six  million  in  2006.  An  equally  meaningful
demonstration of the connection between the withdrawal of community justice and an
increased  reliance  on  formal  institutions  is  the  changing  ratio  between  the  use  of
extrajudicial mediation and court adjudication. In the early 1980s, the ratio was 17:1;
that is, for every case that went to court, 17 were mediated at the community level. In
the 2000s, the ratio became 1:1.4
17 Since  the  community  can  no  longer  contain  and  absorb  disputes,  there  is  a  much
greater demand for police intervention. Without community support, police have to
more frequently resort to intermediary punishment in case-handling. Cases that should
have been absorbed, and were actu ally absorbed, into the community have become
police matters and are given intermediary punishment. With the police becoming more
punitive, intermediary punishment is strained, stretched, and distorted in dealing with
increasing social conflict as the first resort.
18 Another challenge that the author touches upon comes from reform in the criminal
justice system. Intermediary punishment was justified mainly on the ground that it
served  as  an  alternative  to  harsh,  stigmatising  criminal  punishment,  which  was
reserved for enemies of the state. That may have been true in the PRC’s earlier decades,
but has no longer been the case since the 1980s:  three decades of law reform have
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softened criminal punishment, with the result that the dictatorial nature of criminal
law has become much less visible and meaningful. It is well recognised, as the author
argues, that the vast majority of cases relate to “contradictions among the people,” and
that a key principle of criminal law is to educate and rehabilitate.
19 Over the past three decades, courts have become increasingly lenient in sentencing. In
the early 1980s, nearly 40 percent of the defendants were sentenced to terms of not less
than five years’ imprisonment; that percentage dropped to about 25 percent in 2001.
Among defendants who are found guilty by courts after trial, about 20 percent received
non-custodial  sentences,  while  all  offenders  receiving intermediary punishment are
incarcerated.5 The  indisputable  fact  is  that  the  overlapping  jurisdiction  between
criminal and intermediary punishment is vast and expanding, and the criminal justice
system  provides  more  procedural  protection  than  the  administrative  system.
Compared  with  the  ever-improving  criminal  law,  intermediary  punishment,  which
remains unchanged, is harsh in both relative and absolute terms.
20 Given the contradictions, why is intermediary punishment, especially RTL, still  with
us? The answers seem straightforward. The police are a powerful political institution in
China with overriding political power within the legal system. This institution is loyal
to the CCP and plays an instrumental role in safeguarding social order and political
stability. As defective as intermediary punishment may be, the police are allowed to
retain  it,  even though other  institutions,  including the  Congress  and courts,  might
prefer to rein in police power. A convenient police argument has been that, since crime
and order are a serious problem in China, police need power and resources to bring
social  order  problems  under  effective  control.  Police  claim  they  need  independent
power unsupervised by other legal institutions. For the police, their mission is as noble
as it is burdensome.
21 The book’s author does a fine job of unpacking the police justification and revealing the
hidden institutional and sectoral interests of the police. Yes, the use of intermediary
punishment can be politically motivated. RTL in particular has been used to silence
political  criticism by  punishing  dissidents  who are  vocal  in  criticising  the  political
system, or anyone else who is perceived as posing a challenge to the regime.
22 Political  use  of  intermediary  punishment  is  limited,  however.  Given  the  fact  that
national security matters are well covered by national security offences in criminal law,
the purpose of retaining intermediary punishment cannot be ostensibly political. Police
retain  intermediary  punishment,  as  the  book  points  out,  to  advance  their  own
institutional  interest.  Intermediary punishment is  used as  a  convenient  tool  by the
police to dispose of cases in a more expedient manner and to generate a large amount
of  financial  interest  through  the  imposition  of  fines.  Prostitution,  drug  use,  and
gambling are profitable offences, and police want to maintain exclusive control over
them. The police are a politically strong organisation, and have been able to elevate
their sectoral interest to the level of national interest.
23 What should be done about intermediary punishment? There is near consensus that
intermediary  punishment  should  be  placed  under  effective  legal  control,  including
better rules designed to protect rights, effective legal representation, and a fair trial for
those who are charged. In the author‘ s view, China should control police power and
institutionalise  external  legal  or  other  oversight.  Indeed,  the  author  devotes  two
lengthy chapters (pp. 223-327) exclusively to discussing the potential and limitations of
legal  control  of  the police  in general  and RTL in particular.  The author provides a
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concise, detailed, and useful account of legislative and institutional frameworks that
have been put into place to rein in police power.
24 Are the police more accountable because of legislative and institutional reform? The
answer is mixed. Law reform as a whole not only regulates and limits police power, but
also empowers the police at  the same time.  It  is  true that there are more external
mechanisms  in  place  to  supervise  the  police,  and  the  mechanisms  are  more
institutionalised. There is the potential or opportunity, as the author argues, for law
reform to bring greater police accountability to China. Critics may of course argue that
the law and legal framework can also further legitimise and entrench police power.
Police remain powerful in spite of, or more accurately, because of the law.
25 This  brings  us  back to  the  future  of  administrative  punishment.  While  the  book is
written in quite positive tones, and the author is confident that the emerging “legal
field” will continue to expand, although at a slow pace and through “repetition with a
difference” (p. 354), readers may feel more pessimistic after finishing the book. As long
as  the  police  are  powerful,  little  can  be  achieved in  controlling  them through law
reform, and as long as China remains an authoritarian state, the police will continue to
be powerful. Perhaps police power and administrative punishment are simply not the
place to look for an emerging “legal field.”
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